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Abstract 
When covering the policymaking process, the media typically cover both 
substantive aspects of the issue at hand and the political wrangling that occurs as 
lawmakers attempt to agree on a course of action. In this paper, we use the recent 
health care debate to investigate the effects of what we call ‘policy’ and ‘process’ 
frames on the citizens’ perceptions that reform would benefit the nation. First, we 
apply social network analysis to articles from 144 daily U.S. newspapers in order 
to track the changing centrality of each type of frame in media coverage. We then 
combine the results of this analysis with data from the Kaiser Health Tracking 
Poll to demonstrate the effects of policy and process frames on public attitudes. 
The results show that increased policy frame centrality had a positive effect on all 
citizens, regardless of partisan identification or education level, although the 
effect was strongest for Republicans. The effects for increased process frame 
centrality were only observed for those in the middle range of education, with 
partisans on both sides reacting positively, and independents having more 
negative attitudes toward health reform. 
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What you have to remember about health insurance polls is that people feel lots of 
anxiety, and the numbers are always quicksilver. They dart hither and yon, so that 
anybody who reads a poll on national health care and takes it as serious, fixed 
numbers is only going to get blown away the next time you get an exchange in the 
debates… Public opinion has to be shaped and formed, rather than taken as a 
given. 
- Prof. James Morone, Brown University Political 
Scientist, on PBS NewsHour, March 8, 2010 
 
 For the past year, American politics has been dominated in large part by the debate over 
health care reform. The White House, and Congressional Democrats and Republicans have 
debated everything from the broad direction policy should take (e.g. a single-payer system, an 
almost-wholly-private system, or a hybrid of the two) to relatively minute details such as 
whether or not to levy a tax on the use of tanning salons in order to help pay for reform. 
Throughout this process, citizens have stood by as silent and, at times, not-so-silent observers. In 
contrast to many policy debates, in which the public is only marginally aware of happenings 
inside the Beltway, about half of Americans reported following the health care debate ‘very 
closely,’ while only around five percent followed it ‘not at all’ (the remainder followed it 
‘somewhat closely’).1 
 As Prof. Morone notes in the above quote, this heightened public attention to the 
policymaking process resulted in volatility in citizens’ attitudes toward health care reform.  The 
volatility and malleability of citizen opinion, however, is not a new phenomenon (Converse 
1964; Zaller 1992). The complex, multidimensional nature of many issues, such as health care 
reform creates opportunities for strategic politicians to highlight certain, aspects of policy 
debates over others in an attempt to shape citizens’ understanding of and approval for reform 
(Riker 1980, 1990; Jones 1994).  Indeed, E. E. Schattschneider (1960, 68) once stated that “the 
definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power; the antagonists can rarely agree on 
what the issues are because power is involved in the definition.”  In this paper, we examine how 
framing of health care reform in the media, particularly in terms of the balance between coverage 
of substantive aspects of reform and the policymaking process itself, has influenced individuals’ 
attitudes toward reform. Our findings demonstrate that a greater focus on substantive coverage 
led to more positive attitudes among all segments of the public – regardless of partisan 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Data on public attention to the debate is drawn from the Kaiser Health Tracking Polls used throughout this paper. 
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identification or level of education – while the effects for process coverage differed depending 
on where an individual stood on these two independent variables. 
 
Media Frames and Public Opinion 
  This paper builds on a growing line of research that explores the ways in which different 
types of media frames affect public opinion. Framing is a fundamental aspect of political 
communication and debate. Politicians and parties attempt to win support for their most preferred 
policies through strategically emphasizing certain aspects or dimensions of issues that provide 
them an advantage over the opposition (Schattschneider 1960; Riker 1986; Edelman 2001) 
(Edelman 2001; Riker 1986; Schattschneider 1960).  According to Gamson and Modigliani 
(1989, 143) a frame serves as a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an 
unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them.  The frame suggests what the 
controversy is about, the essence of the issue.”  Previous studies suggest that the way in which an 
issue is framed can produce attitude change (Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Nelson and Oxley 
1999). More recent research has sought to understand the psychological processes underlying 
“framing effects” and the conditions under which framing effects may be enhanced or attenuated, 
including individual dispositions such as values (Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Lau and 
Schlesinger 2005; J. N Druckman 2008), individuals’ level of education (Kinder and Sanders 
1996; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Miller and Krosnick 
2000), and the existence of strong, competitive frames on both sides of an issue (Chong and 
James N. Druckman 2007; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). 
Much of this research focuses on the distinction between ‘substantive’ and ‘strategy’ 
frames. The former category includes a range of framing subtypes, such as focusing on 
candidates’ issue positions and performance in office during electoral campaigns (e.g. Jamieson 
1993; Brewer and Sigelman 2002) or on a particular set of values underlying a policy proposal 
(e.g. Chong 1993; Kellstedt 2000), while the latter encompasses frames such as campaign 
strategy (e.g. Jamieson 1993; Cappella and Jamieson 1996) and the ‘games’ played by politicians 
during the policymaking process (e.g. Lawrence 2000). Studies have demonstrated a growing 
prevalence for strategy frames since the mid-20th Century (Patterson 1993), although some argue 
that there has been more substantive coverage than is typically acknowledged (Graber 2009) and 
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that the balance between the two types of frames depends on the level of government and the 
substantive focus of the story (Lawrence 2000). 
 In terms of substantive frames, numerous scholars have shown that individuals’ policy 
attitudes differ depending on which core value or general policy area a proposal is linked to (e.g. 
free speech vs. public safety, environment vs. economy) (Chong 1993; Nelson, Clawson, and 
Oxley 1997; Kellstedt 2000; Brewer 2003; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001; Nelson and Oxley 
1999; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). In contrast to this focus on public opinion, much of the 
research into strategy frames has focused on demonstrating their role in demobilizing (Crigler, 
Just, and Belt 2006; Cappella and Jamieson 1997), polarizing (Crigler, Just, and Belt 2006), 
and/or evoking lower levels of trust and higher levels of cynicism and negative attitudes about 
politics among citizens (de Vreese 2004, 2005; de Vreese and Elenbaas 2008; Cappella and 
Jamieson 1996, 1997; Valentino, Buhr, and Beckmann 2001). 
 In addition to looking at whether substantive and strategy frames influence the public, 
many of these studies have also taken into account the possibility that the presence or magnitude 
of these effects depends on other factors, such as political predispositions and political 
knowledge and sophistication. In doing so, this research draws on Zaller (1992, 1996) and others 
(e.g. Krosnick and Kinder 1990; Nelson, Oxley, and Clawson 1997) who have looked at the 
pervasive impact these variables have on how citizens process and use political information. 
Specifically, Zaller posits that predispositions will come into play in terms of whether or not 
individuals receive and accept considerations, with people more likely to seek out sources and 
take in information that comes from sources with whom they share a partisan affiliation and/or 
other characteristics. Additionally, Zaller argues that those ‘in the middle’ in terms of political 
sophistication will be the most affected by new information, as they pay enough attention to 
politics to be exposed to it (unlike those lower on the sophistication scale) but do not hold such 
strong predispositions and prior opinions that the information is unlikely to have an effect (unlike 
those higher on the sophistication scale). 
 The application of these theories has yielded mixed results in terms of research on the 
effects of substantive and strategy frames. Using a lab experiment, Valentino et al. (2001) find 
that both partisan identification and education level determine whether or not strategy frames 
have negative effects on citizens, with those with less education and no partisan identification 
strongly influenced while their more-educated and partisan peers were largely unaffected. 
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Haider-Markel and Joslyn (2001) show similar results – that less-sophisticated and nonpartisan 
individuals are more susceptible to framing effects – in a survey experiment focusing on the 
substantive framing of gun policy. On the other hand, Brewer (2003) finds an interaction for 
political knowledge in terms of the effects of certain substantive frames but not others, and 
Criger et al. (2006) find that strategy frames have the greatest impact on increasing cynicism for 
Republicans, in contrast to Democrats or Independents. 
 In this paper, we attempt to shed further light on this debate over interactions with 
predispositions and sophistication in addition to offering a direct test of the effects of substantive 
and strategy frames. Here, we term these framing categories ‘policy’ and ‘process’ to better 
reflect a policymaking (as opposed to campaign) context. Policy frames, like the substantive 
frames described above, evoke ideas or concerns about the issues, problems, and potential 
solutions at hand (e.g. ‘access,’ ‘underinsured’). In contrast, process frames concern the path 
health care legislation took to passage and the various actors who influenced it along the way 
(e.g. ‘pharmaceutical companies,’ ‘reconciliation’). 
 Our empirical expectations depend on the frame type. For policy frames, we expect that 
periods of heightened media focus will result in polarization along party lines as citizens pick up 
on elite position-taking. In contrast, prior studies give us reason to believe that a focus on process 
will lead to less confidence in health care reform. 
 
H1: Greater policy frame centrality will result in greater polarization between the 
opinions of Democrats and Republicans. 
 
H2: Greater process frame centrality will result in less-positive attitudes about health care 
reform. 
 
We also expect that the above effects will differ depending on political sophistication and 
predispositions. We operationalize the former using education, following Price and Zaller’s 
(1993) recommendation to use this measure when a set of general political knowledge questions 
is unavailable. For predispositions, we focus on partisan identification. For both, we expect those 
‘in the middle’ of the spectrum (i.e. moderate education or independent) to display the greatest 
effects. 
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H3: The magnitude of the effects of both policy and process frame centrality will be 
higher among citizens in the middle of the education range than among those at either 
end of this spectrum.  
 
H4: The magnitude of the effects of process frame centrality will be higher among 
independents than among partisans.  
 
 
In addition to testing the above hypotheses, this paper also brings a new method to the 
study of political communication and public opinion: social network analysis (SNA). Social 
network analysis has been increasingly applied to political questions, including various aspects 
of the legislative process (Fowler 2006a, 2006b; Porter et al. 2007; Porter, Onnela, and Mucha 
2009; Ringe, Victor, and Gross 2009), interest group coalitions (Box-Steffensmeier and 
Christenson 2009; Grossmann and Dominguez 2009; Robbins 2009), and the use of legal 
precedents in Supreme Court decisions (Fowler and Jeon 2008). Although policy and process 
frames are clearly not humans who interact socially in the same ways that politicians do, one can 
think of them as ‘interacting’ in terms of being combined in different ways across multiple 
‘events’ (here defined as newspaper articles). 
By viewing media frames through a network lens, one is able to gauge their prominence 
through more sophisticated means than by classifying stories as focused on one or both types of 
frames or counting the number of times a particular frame appears. Specifically, in this paper we 
use eigenvector centrality (described in more depth below), a measure that takes into account the 
number of times a frame appears in an article with other frames, giving greater weight when 
those other frames are themselves more central. As a result, we are able to measure the extent to 
which a frame or a category of frames permeated the information environment and separate those 
frames that appeared only in stories with a specialized focus from others that popped up in 
stories on a wider range of topics. 
 
Data and Method 
 In order to determine the effects of policy and process frames on public attitudes 
regarding health care reform, we combine data from two sources: Lexis-Nexis and the Kaiser 
Family Foundation Health Tracking Poll. The latter is a monthly (previously bimonthly) survey 
that focuses on health-care issues and includes a wide range of questions related to health reform. 
For this paper, we use the eight surveys currently available through the Roper Center for Public 
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Opinion Research: February 2009, April 2009, and surveys for each month from June to 
November 2009. We plan to incorporate additional polls into our analysis as they become 
available to the public.2 
 Our other data source – Lexis-Nexis – allowed us to compile an extensive database of 
newspaper coverage of health care reform from February to November 2009. Specifically, we 
searched a set of 144 daily, U.S., English-language newspapers that focus on general news 
coverage (as opposed to industry-specific concerns).3 These newspapers represent a very large 
range of market sizes, from national powerhouses such as The New York Times to Today’s 
Sunbeam, a paper that serves Salem County, New Jersey, southeast of Wilmington, DE. As a 
result, we are confident that our study captures the overall dynamics of media coverage rather 
than being slanted in favor of Beltway elite sources. We compiled all stories in these newspapers 
that had the keywords “Health Care Reform” and/or “Obama Health Care Reform” as major 
terms. The searches were conducted so that we created a separate set of articles for the week 
prior to each survey date. For example, the June 8 set of articles contains coverage from all 
sources between June 1 and June 7. A week was selected as the time interval based on research 
that demonstrates the power of the recency of considerations in shaping survey responses (Zaller 
1992). 
 The sets of newspaper articles were then parsed into individual articles using a Perl script 
and processed using the tm and sna packages in R. Before using tm (a text-mining package), 
we first created a dictionary of frames that we believed would appear in coverage of health care 
reform and categorizing each as either a ‘policy’ or a ‘process’ frame. Policy frames were 
defined as those that captured substantive aspects of health care reform, such as ‘cost shifting’ or 
‘individual mandate,’ and key policy targets (‘children’). Process frames indicate features of the 
legislative process, such as particular coalitions (‘blue dogs’), strategic actions (‘town hall’), and 
interest groups (‘big business’).4 Using tm, we parsed each article and matched the terms to our 
frame dictionary. We then constructed affiliation matrices for each day of coverage in which 
each cell indicates the frequency with which a frame appears with another frame in a newspaper 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The Kaiser Health Tracking Poll is funded by the Henry J. Kaiser Foundation and conducted by Princeton Survey 
Research Associates International. Each poll uses a national adult sample drawn using random-digit dialing of both 
landline and mobile telephone numbers. 
3 A list of these publications is included in Appendix B. 
4 A complete list of all 152 frames, their classifications as policy or process, and alternative wordings that were 
accounted for is included in Appendix C. 
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story.  We recoded terms appearing multiple times within a single article as 1.  Thus, the 
affiliation matrix was a 152 x 152 matrix where each column and row represents the frame. This 
bi-modal network representing the affiliation of a set of frames with a set of newspaper articles 
on health care reform can then be analyzed using standard network analysis techniques 
(Wasserman and Faust 1994). 
 These matrices were used by the sna package to calculate eigenvector centrality, one of 
multiple measures of centrality employed in social network analysis. Eigenvector centrality is a 
‘closeness’ measure; in contrast to ‘degree’ measures of centrality, closeness measures take into 
account the position of the node in relation to the entire network rather than just the number of 
direct ties. Specifically, eigenvector centrality weights links to globally ‘important’ nodes more 
than it weights links to nodes with local prominence (Bonacich 1972; Wasserman and Faust 
1994). Figure 1 provides an illustration of this concept using the frame network from February 5, 
2009.5 In this network, the ‘exchange’ and ‘choice’ nodes would have the same score for degree 
centrality as each is linked to one other node. However, the ‘exchange’ node would have higher 
eigenvector centrality because the node it is linked to (‘single payer’) is linked to another node, 
which is then linked to many other nodes, while the ‘choice’ node is linked a node (‘history’) 
that is not linked to any other nodes. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 In the context of media content, eigenvector centrality allows us to gauge the extent to 
which a frame is central not only in articles about specific aspects of health policy but in 
newspaper coverage as a whole. This measure also has the advantage of taking the size of the 
network into account, which allows us to control for the fact that discourse was considerably 
more complex in the later months of 2009 than in February and April. Since in this paper we are 
interested in comparing the effects of policy and process frames on public opinion, we average 
the non-zero eigenvector centrality scores within each of the two categories for each survey day. 
Thus, each Kaiser poll participant is assigned a value that reflects the average policy frame 
centrality for the week prior to their survey date and a similar value for process frame centrality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This example was chosen due to the simplicity of the February networks; the frame networks in other months are 
far more complex due to rising prominence of health reform on the national agenda. 
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 The first step in our empirical analysis involves looking at the dynamics of framing in 
newspaper coverage as the debate progresses. We do this through descriptive statistics and an 
OLS model that allows us to determine whether there are statistically significant differences in 
the prominence of policy and process frames as the policy process progresses. In addition, we 
provide a brief overview of the most-central specific policy and process frames in each month. 
 In the second stage of the analysis, we use the Kaiser surveys to investigate the effects of 
these frames on public opinion. Specifically, we focus on citizens’ responses to the following 
question: 
 
Do you think the country as a whole would be (better off) or (worse off) if the 
president and Congress passed health care reform, or don’t you think it would 
make much difference? 
 
Kaiser does not ask a straightforward question regarding general support for or opposition to 
health care reform, although it does ask such questions about particular components of health 
policy (e.g. Cadillac tax, expanding coverage). As a result, the above question is the best 
measure of general attitudes toward health reform. In addition, this question offers the advantage 
of being asked on every survey, while the more specific questions enter and leave the poll 
protocol as their prominence in the debate rises and falls. We use ordered probit analysis to 
determine which factors shape responses to this question. In order to pick up the potential for 
partisans to polarize in their opinions, we interact the key independent variables (the mean 
eigenvector centrality of policy and process frames) with partisan identification. We also include 
a number of key control variables (insurance status, education, age, income, and race) in the 
model and cluster the standard errors by month to account for any systematic errors among the 
polls.  The most notable omission in our model is a control variable for ideology, as the Kaiser 
Foundation did not consistently include a question for ideology in its polls. In order to address 
the question of differential effects depending on general political sophistication, we estimate the 
model once for all respondents and once each for those at a low (high school or less), moderate 
(some college or technical school), or high (college graduate and above) level of education.  
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Results 
 We begin with a descriptive look at the dynamics of process and policy frame dominance 
in the health care debate. Recall that the measures used here are two averages computed for each 
survey date: the mean of all non-zero eigenvector centrality scores for policy frames for 
newspaper articles published in the week prior to the survey date, and the same for process 
frames. Figure 2 displays boxplots of these two measures broken down by survey month. As one 
would expect, policy frames dominate in February, when media coverage was focused on 
President Obama’s general goals for reform rather than the politics surrounding the issue. 
Indeed, the four most central frames in this time period, as shown in Figure 3, all spoke to broad 
policy goals: ‘universal,’ ‘access,’ ‘uninsured,’ and ‘children.’ The balance shifted toward 
process in April, primarily due to the ‘bipartisan’ frame leaping to the top of the centrality 
ranking after not appearing in the top 15 in February and the related focus on ‘compromise.’ In 
addition, the Kaiser survey entered the field just before the April 13 decision in the highly 
contested Minnesota Senate race, which likely accounts for the high centrality for the ‘filibuster’ 
frame, given that Al Franken’s win gave the Democrats the 60 votes needed to invoke cloture. 
 In June and July, Congress was involved in bill markup and committee passage, while the 
president publicly battled with Republican leaders about the appropriate role of the federal 
government in health care. Throughout this phase of the debate, policy frames such as ‘single 
payer’ and ‘private insurers’ were most central, although process tropes such as ‘bipartisan’ and 
‘compromise’ continued to have a presence. During the August congressional recess, the 
conservative challenge to direction reform was taking is seen in the emergence of frames such as 
‘obamacare’ and ‘government takeover,’ and the increasing centrality of ‘choice.’ The 
significant media attention to the town hall meetings held across the nation is also seen in the 
high centrality of this frame in August and September. In the last three months covered by this 
study (September, October, and November), policy frames barely edged out process frames in 
centrality. One can see the prominence of the public option in all three months, in addition to 
themes such as ‘partisan’ and ‘nonpartisan’ as Congress debates legislation. 
 In addition to looking at these descriptive depictions of the shifting focus of newspaper 
coverage of the health care debate, we also estimated an OLS model to test whether there were 
statistically significant differences in the centrality of policy and process frames in each survey 
period. The results, displayed in Table 1, show that policy frames clearly dominated in February 
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(the omitted category), June, and August (although to a lesser degree in this month). In July, 
October, and November, policy frames were only slightly more central than process frames; and 
in September the two were basically equal in prominence. Comparing these results to Figure 2, 
one can see that although the inter-quartile range (IQR) for process frames is at times wider than 
the IQR for policy frames, there are typically many more outliers among the policy frames, thus 
explaining why policy concerns were more central in all time periods. 
 
[Table 1 about here.] 
 
 Building on this variation in the prominence of both policy and process frames, we use an 
ordered probit model to estimate the effects of frame centrality on citizens’ perceptions that 
health care reform will benefit the nation. Recall that for both policy and process frames, our 
expectation is that greater centrality will lead to more polarization between Democrats and 
Republicans as the competing party messages become clearer to the public. In addition, we test 
for an interactive effect of education by estimating the general model three additional times: once 
for those with a low level of education (high school or less), once for those in the middle of the 
education spectrum (some college or technical school), and once for those with high education 
(college graduate or higher). The results of all models are shown in Table 2.  
 
[Table 2 about here.] 
 
 Starting with the first model, which includes individuals of all educational backgrounds, 
policy frame centrality had a statistically significant, positive effect for citizens of all partisan 
affiliations, although this effect was strongest for Republicans. In contrast, process frame 
centrality only had an effect on Republicans, although once again this effect was positive, 
indicating a greater sense that reform will be beneficial. The magnitude of these effects are 
illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5, which display the predicted probability of a respondent 
picking each response category across the entire range of mean centrality scores, broken down 
by partisan identification (all other variables are set at their means, or, in the case of categorical 
variables, their medians). As can be seen in the top frame of both figures, Democratic support 
and opposition remained relatively stable no matter how central policy and process frames were 
in media coverage. On the other hand, Republicans are much more influenced by changing 
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centrality levels, particularly in the case of policy frames, with a 0.35-point shift for both the 
‘better off’ and ‘worse off’ categories between the centrality extremes. 
 
[Figure 4 and Figure 5 about here.] 
 
 Certainly none of these results offer support for our hypothesis that partisans will polarize 
when policy or process frames come to the fore in newspaper coverage. Instead, it appears that 
Democrats were relatively unmoving in their attitudes toward health care reform, and 
Republicans, perhaps paradoxically, moved toward more positive opinions when either policy or 
process frames became more central. One explanation for this pattern is that Republicans were 
simply more supportive in the early stages of the health care debate and February and April had 
generally high centrality scores when compared to other months. However, the coefficients for 
the Republican interaction terms for both policy and process frame centrality maintain their 
direction and statistical significance even if these two months are dropped from the model. 
Instead, it is likely that Republicans responded in this way because many of the events that 
occurred in this period could easily be viewed as Republican victories in terms of moving health 
reform in a more centrist direction, while Democrats may have been frustrated that more-
progressive options, such as a single-payer system, did not remain on the bargaining table for 
long. In other words, our results indicate the challenges of discerning what one should expect 
from greater policy or process centrality in terms of interactions with partisan identification, 
given that the centrality of a frame such as ‘public option’ could evoke more positive attitudes 
from either Republicans or Democrats depending on the actual context in which that frame is 
being evoked. Although we are unable to pursue a more contextual analysis of the effects of 
specific frames in this paper, we plan to do so in future analyses. 
 Turning back to Table 2 and looking again at the overall model, there is also an 
interesting result among the control variables: insurance status has no effect on attitudes toward 
health reform. Rather than basing their opinions on self-interest, citizens appear to be influenced 
by political affiliations (the indicators for Democrats and Republicans are statistically significant 
and in the expected directions) and demographics, with higher-income, older, and white 
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individuals perceiving reform as less beneficial to the nation.6 Notably, the variable for education 
is not statistically significant. 
 Education is a significant factor, however, in determining the effects of policy and 
process frame centrality. Turning to the education-specific models in Table 2, it appears that 
there is a three-way interaction among the centrality of policy frames, education level, and 
partisan identification. For independents, greater policy centrality affected those at all levels of 
education, although the magnitude of this effect is greatest for those in the middle category, as 
expected given current understandings of the effects of political sophistication on the effects of 
political information. However, the coefficients for Democrats and Republicans are relatively 
equal across all levels of education. We are unable to explain this puzzling result, although it 
may be due in part to the extremely high public prominence of this issue (which would lead to 
greater attention from the less sophisticated than one would normally find) and the fact that what 
‘health care reform’ meant concretely shifted significantly during this phase of the debate (which 
would explain attitude instability among the most educated). 
 In contrast to the somewhat muddled results for the interaction between policy frame 
centrality and education, the interaction between process frame centrality and education is in line 
with our expectations. The interaction terms in Table 2 show that process frame centrality has no 
effect on those at either end of the educational spectrum but has a statistically significant 
influence on those with a moderate level of education. In addition, the direction of this 
relationship depends on the partisan identification of the respondent. These relationships are 
displayed in Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8. 
 
[Figure 6, Figure 7, and Figure 8 about here.] 
 
 Figure 6 shows predicted probabilities for those with a low level of education. As 
indicated by the coefficients, there are no statistically significant effects of process centrality on 
this group, despite the fact that one might assume a positive effect for Republicans after looking 
at the predicted probability graphs. Figure 8 offers a much clearer look at a lack of effect for 
policy frame centrality. For those of all political persuasions, media coverage of political 
wrangling appears to have absolutely no affect on attitudes toward health care reform. Finally, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The findings for income and age are consistent with Gelman et al.’s (2010) analysis of public attitudes toward 
health care reform. 
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Figure 7 offers a look at those in the middle of the education spectrum. Notably, increased 
process frame centrality has a positive effect on the attitudes of Democrats and Republicans but a 
negative effect on independents, thus lending empirical support to the idea that independents are 
more likely to be turned off by political wrangling. 
 In sum, the evidence was mixed in terms of supporting our hypotheses. Perhaps the most 
important overall findings were that predispositions and sophistication proved to be key 
mediating factors in determining whether and how policy and process frames impacted the 
public, as proposed in H3 and H4. Democrats appeared relatively unmoved throughout the 
process even with fluctuations in how the debate was framed in the media, while there was some 
movement among independents and Republicans. The significance of partisan predispositions is 
consistent with prior research that has emphasized the need to control for predispositions to 
properly assess the nature and extent of framing effects (J. N Druckman 2008; Haider-Markel 
and Joslyn 2001). Although these results need further examination, it may be that many 
Democrats may have felt obligated to maintain their public support for reform regardless of 
events in the public debate, while Republicans displayed positive responses to policy ‘wins’ (e.g. 
dropping the public option) and independents were highly sensitive to process frames. 
 Our expectation about political sophistication – that those ‘in the middle’ would display 
the greatest effects from changes in the information environment – found evidence in terms of 
our analysis of the effects of process frames but not for policy frames. Low- and highly-educated 
individuals did not appear influenced by the media prominence of the lawmaking process, most 
likely because the former were not paying enough attention and the latter had opinions that were 
not susceptible to the effects of non-substantive frames. Those with a moderate level of 
education, in contrast, were affected in ways that were also linked to their partisan affiliations, 
with Democrats and Republicans rallying behind their teams and independents turned off by 
political battles. Thus, our primary hypotheses – that greater centrality for policy frames would 
lead to polarization by partisanship and that greater centrality for process frames would lead to 
more negative attitudes about health care reform – did not prove true across the board. Instead, 
these effects appeared only for specific partisan and educational subgroups. 
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Conclusion and Next Steps 
Public opinion is central to the functioning of democracy. The quality of representation is 
often judged by the extent to which public policy reflects citizen preferences (Erikson, Wright, 
and McIver 1994; Erikson, Mackuen, and Stimson 2002; Page and Shapiro 1992). While public 
opinion on the issue of health care reform is rooted in many sources beyond those captured by 
the frames offered by the media, the manner in which journalists portrayed this policy debate 
helps explain some of the movement in public opinion among particular segments of the mass 
public. Given that the prominence of particular media frames is driven in part by the actual 
policy debate, it appears that at least some citizens were influenced by the substantive and 
procedural themes and events that emerged during this lengthy policymaking process. 
This paper focuses on the distinction between policy and process frames; however, there 
are a variety of other ways in which we could use social network analysis to expand on the study 
of how media framing influenced public opinion in the context of health care reform. Most 
notably, we do not code our dictionary of frames in terms of their associations with the pro- or 
anti-reform positions or investigate their connections to specific political actors, such as 
President Obama. These factors are likely to moderate the public’s willingness to accept and use 
information and exploring them may also shed light on the elite framing strategies employed in 
this policy debate. Furthermore, the methods and data used in this paper allow us to track the 
prominence of specific frames (e.g. ‘public option,’ ‘bipartisanship’) and link them to questions 
on the Kaiser polls that pick up on public preferences about particular aspects of health reform, 
in contrast to the more general attitudes explored here.  
 The substantive contributions of this paper are primarily to provide further evidence for 
already established theories about the relationship between the media framing and public 
attitudes, particularly the fact that predispositions and political sophistication play key mediating 
roles. Yet we also hope that this paper has demonstrated the potential for social network analysis 
to contribute to the analysis of these phenomena. By moving beyond story-level coding and 
frame counts to a more complex measure of centrality, we believe that network analysis provides 
a novel and valuable approach to gauging how the information environment shapes the public’s 
involvement in and reactions to the policymaking process.
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Network of Frames for February 5, 2009 
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Figure 2. Distribution of Eigenvector Centrality Scores, by Month and Frame Type 
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Figure 3. Most Central Frames in News Coverage, February-November 2009 
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Table 1. Frame Eigenvector Centrality as a Function of Frame Type and Month (OLS Estimates) 
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
Policy Frame 0.071∗∗∗ (0.019)
Policy * Apr 09 -0.101∗∗∗ (0.023)
Policy * Jun 09 -0.031 (0.024)
Policy * Jul 09 -0.056∗∗ (0.022)
Policy * Aug 09 -0.041∗ (0.022)
Policy * Sep 09 -0.067∗∗∗ (0.021)
Policy * Oct 09 -0.050∗∗ (0.022)
Policy * Nov 09 -0.059∗∗∗ (0.022)
April 2009 0.022 (0.021)
June 2009 -0.026 (0.022)
July 2009 -0.035∗ (0.020)
August 2009 -0.052∗∗∗ (0.019)
September 2009 -0.045∗∗ (0.019)
October 2009 -0.048∗∗ (0.019)
November 2009 -0.046∗∗ (0.019)
Intercept 0.112∗∗∗ (0.017)
N 3495
R2 0.063
F (15,3479) 15.695
Significance levels : ∗ : p<0.10 ∗∗ : p<0.05 ∗ ∗ ∗ : p<0.01
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Table 2. Belief that Health Care Reform will Benefit the Nation as a Function of Policy and 
Process Frame Eigenvector Centrality and Partisanship (Ordered Probit Estimates) 
All Low Ed Mid Ed High Ed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mean EVC - Policy 3.229 2.831 4.694 2.648
(0.546)∗∗∗ (1.012)∗∗∗ (0.694)∗∗∗ (0.762)∗∗∗
Policy EVC * Dem -.896 0.713 -3.040 -.400
(0.768) (1.103) (1.726)∗ (2.070)
Policy EVC * Rep 2.162 3.199 1.043 2.567
(0.765)∗∗∗ (1.050)∗∗∗ (1.602) (1.324)∗
Mean EVC - Process -.346 1.509 -3.013 0.088
(1.183) (2.005) (1.299)∗∗ (0.583)
Process EVC * Dem 0.649 -2.756 4.300 0.514
(0.784) (1.832) (0.819)∗∗∗ (2.858)
Process EVC * Rep 1.620 1.362 4.905 0.131
(0.493)∗∗∗ (1.309) (1.793)∗∗∗ (0.847)
Democrat 0.73 0.672 0.663 0.875
(0.14)∗∗∗ (0.258)∗∗∗ (0.251)∗∗∗ (0.167)∗∗∗
Republican -.948 -1.042 -1.096 -.834
(0.137)∗∗∗ (0.169)∗∗∗ (0.279)∗∗∗ (0.186)∗∗∗
Currently Insured -.080 -.134 -.030 0.093
(0.086) (0.084) (0.123) (0.142)
Education (Years) 0.014
(0.01)
Income (Thousands) -.002 -.004 -.003 -.001
(0.001)∗ (0.002)∗ (0.002)∗ (0.0009)
Age (Years) -.003 -.005 -.004 0.00003
(0.0008)∗∗∗ (0.001)∗∗∗ (0.002)∗∗ (0.002)
Hispanic 0.243 0.252 0.247 0.092
(0.048)∗∗∗ (0.051)∗∗∗ (0.135)∗ (0.12)
African American 0.287 0.293 0.148 0.443
(0.072)∗∗∗ (0.152)∗ (0.058)∗∗ (0.102)∗∗∗
Asian/Asian American 0.286 -.164 0.158 0.618
(0.098)∗∗∗ (0.206) (0.299) (0.13)∗∗∗
τ1 -.318 -.756 -.589 -.087
(0.276) (0.287)∗∗∗ (0.214)∗∗∗ (0.257)
τ2 0.214 -.050 -.053 0.314
(0.245) (0.273) (0.196) (0.244)
Obs. 6912 2246 2018 2659
χ2 statistic 118.476 752.382 885.208 219.501
∗ : p<0.10, ∗∗ : p<0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ : p<0.01
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Figure 4. Predicted Probability of Believing Health Reform Will Make Nation Better Off as a 
Factor of Policy Frame Prominence and Partisan Identification 
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Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Believing Health Reform Will Make Nation Better Off as a 
Factor of Process Frame Prominence and Partisan Identification 
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Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Those with a Low Level of Education Believing Health 
Reform Will Make the Nation Better Off as a Factor of Process Frame Centrality and Partisan 
Identification 
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Figure 7. Predicted Probability of Those with a Moderate Level of Education Believing Health 
Reform Will Make the Nation Better Off as a Factor of Process Frame Centrality and Partisan 
Identification 
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Figure 8. Predicted Probability of Those with a High Level of Education Believing Health 
Reform Will Make the Nation Better Off as a Factor of Process Frame Centrality and Partisan 
Identification 
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Appendix B: List of Newspapers 
Advance Publications Newspapers (Includes: Ann Arbor News (Michigan), Bay City Times (Michigan), 
Birmingham News, Eastern Express Times (Pennsylvania), Flint Journal (Michigan), Gloucester County Times 
(New Jersey), Grand Rapids Press (Michigan), Huntsville Times (Alabama), Jersey Journal (New Jersey), 
Kalamazoo Gazette (Michigan), Mobile Register (Alabama), Muskegon Chronicle (Michigan), Patriot News 
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania), Saginaw News (Michigan), Springfield Republican (Massachusetts), Staten Island 
Advance (New York), The Oregonian, The Plain Dealer, The Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY), The Star-Ledger 
(Newark, New Jersey), The Times-Picayune, Today's Sunbeam (New Jersey)) 
The Advocate (Baton Rouge, Louisiana) 
The Albuquerque Journal 
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette 
The Atlanta Journal and Constitution 
The Augusta Chronicle 
The Austin American-Statesman 
Bangor Daily News (Maine) 
The Bismarck Tribune 
The Boston Herald 
The Buffalo News 
The Capital (Annapolis, MD) 
Capital Times (Madison, WI) 
Charleston Daily Mail 
The Charleston Gazette 
Chattanooga Times Free Press 
Chicago Daily Herald 
Chicago Sun-Times 
The Christian Science Monitor 
The Columbian (Vancouver, WA) 
The Columbus Dispatch 
The Daily News of Los Angeles 
Dayton Daily News 
The Denver Post 
Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City) 
The Florida Times-Union 
Fort Wayne News-Sentinel (Indiana) 
Grand Rapids Press (Michigan) 
Herald News (Passaic County, NJ) 
The Herald-Sun 
The Houston Chronicle 
Idaho Falls Post Register 
Intelligencer Journal/New Era (Lancaster, Pennsylvania) 
Jackson Citizen Patriot 
Las Vegas Review-Journal 
The Ledger (Lakeland) 
Lewiston Morning Tribune 
MediaNews Group Pubs (Includes: Alameda Times-Star (Alameda, CA), Brattleboro Reformer (Vermont), 
Connecticut Post Online, Contra Costa Times, Deming Headlight (New Mexico), El Paso Times (Texas), 
Enterprise Record (Chico, California), Eureka Times-Standard (California), Fairbanks Daily News-Miner (Alaska), 
Farmington Daily Times (New Mexico), Inland Valley Daily Bulletin (Ontario, CA), Inside Bay Area (California), 
Las Cruces Sun-News (New Mexico), Long Beach Press-Telegram (Long Beach, CA), Lowell Sun (Lowell, MA), 
Marin Independent Journal (Marin, CA), Monterey County Herald (CA), Oroville Mercury Register (California), 
Pasadena Star-News (Pasadena, CA), Public Opinion (Chambersburg, Pennsylvania), Ruidoso News (New 
Mexico), San Bernardino Sun (San Bernardino, CA), San Gabriel Valley Tribune (San Gabriel Valley, CA), San 
Jose Mercury News (California), San Mateo County Times (San Mateo, CA), Sentinel & Enterprise (Fitchburg, 
Massachusetts), Silver City Sun-News (New Mexico), St. Paul Pioneer Press (Minnesota), The Alamogordo Daily 
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News (New Mexico), The Argus (Fremont, CA), The Berkshire Eagle (Pittsfield, Massachusetts), The Daily 
Review (Hayward, CA), The Evening Sun (Hanover, PA), The Lebanon Daily News (Pennsylvania), The Oakland 
Tribune (Oakland, CA), The Salt Lake Tribune, The York Dispatch (York, PA), Tri-Valley Herald (Pleasanton, 
CA), Vallejo Times-Herald (California), Whittier Daily News (California)) 
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
The New York Post 
The New York Times 
News & Record (Greensboro, NC) 
Newsday (New York, NY) 
The Palm Beach Post 
The Pantagraph 
The Patriot Ledger 
The Philadelphia Daily News (PA) 
The Philadelphia Inquirer 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette 
Pittsburgh Tribune Review 
Portland Press Herald 
The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC) 
The Press Enterprise 
The Providence Journal-Bulletin 
The Record (Bergen County, NJ) 
Richmond Times Dispatch 
The Roanoke Times (Virginia) 
San Antonio Express-News 
San Diego Union-Tribune 
The San Francisco Chronicle 
The Santa Fe New Mexican 
Sarasota Herald-Tribune 
South Bend Tribune 
The Spokesman-Review 
St. Louis Post-Dispatch 
St. Petersburg Times 
Star Tribune (Minneapolis MN) 
Star-News (Wilmington, NC) 
The Tampa Tribune 
Telegram & Gazette (Massachusetts) 
Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA) 
The Times of Trenton (New Jersey) 
The Times Union (Albany, NY) 
Topeka Capital-Journal 
Tribune-Review 
The Tulsa World 
The Union Leader 
USA Today 
The Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA) 
The Washington Post 
The Washington Times 
Winston-Salem Journal 
Wisconsin State Journal 
The Wyoming Tribune-Eagle 
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Appendix C: Frame Dictionary 
Key Term Frame Type Alternate Wordings 
abortion policy hyde amendment; stupak amendment; stupak compromise; abortion amendment; federal funding of abortion 
access policy accessibility; accessible 
aging population policy baby boomers 
alcohol tax policy tax on alcohol; taxes on alcohol; alcohol taxes 
baby killer process  
back to the 
drawing board process start over; kill the bill 
bankruptcy policy medical bills 
basic health plan policy minimal benefits; minimal coverage; catastrophic coverage; minimum coverage; catastrophic plan; basic coverage; basic health plans 
bending the cost 
curve policy cost curve; cost containment 
big business process corporation; business executives; ceos; ceo 
bipartisan process bipartisanship 
blue dogs process blue dog; blue dog democrat 
Britain policy British; NHS; UK; United Kingdom; England; English; National Health Service 
bureaucrat policy bureaucrats; government bureaucrats; government bureaucrat 
cadillac tax policy cadillac; gold plated 
Canada policy  
children policy age 25; age 26; dependents 
choice policy choose; limit choice 
chronic conditions policy chronic illness; chronic condition 
cigarette tax policy tax on cigarettes; taxes on cigarettes 
Clinton process 1992; 1993; 1994; early 90s; early 1990s; 1990s 
clintoncare process hillarycare 
competition policy competitive 
compromise process concession; concede; concedes; compromises; compromised 
constitutional policy Constitution; unconstitutional 
consumer groups process  
copays policy co pays; copay; co pay; out of pocket; deductible; deductibles 
cornhusker 
kickback process  
cost cutting policy cost saving; reining in costs; rein in costs 
cost effective policy  
cost shifting policy  
create jobs policy  
death panel policy  
defensive 
medicine policy defensive doctor 
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deficit  policy  
deficit neutral policy financially sound 
delivery system policy  
Democratic 
opposition process opposition from democrats; dissent among democrats 
democratic 
support process support from democrats 
deny coverage policy denied coverage 
doctor process AMA; American Medical Association; physician; doctors; physicians 
doctor patient 
relationship policy relationship between patients and doctors 
doctor shortage policy physician shortage; provider shortage 
donut hole policy doughnut hole; coverage gap; medicare part d 
drug costs policy cost of prescription drugs; generics 
economic crisis policy economy; recession; make ends meet; making ends meet 
electronic records policy electronic medical records; emr; health information technologies 
emergency room policy ER; emergency department 
employer based policy employer provided; employer sponsored; portability 
employer mandate policy require employers; requiring employers 
Europe policy European 
euthanasia policy  
exchange policy exchanges; insurance exchange; health exchange; health care exchange; federal exchange; state exchange 
executive order process  
expand CHIP policy expand SCHIP; expanding CHIP; expanding SCHIP 
expand eligibility policy   
expand Medicaid policy expanding Medicaid; medicaid expansion 
expand Medicare policy Medicare expansion; expanding medicare 
expansion of 
coverage policy expanding coverage; expand coverage 
expensive tests policy expensive procedures; expensive treatments 
fee for service policy doctors fees 
filibuster process cloture; supermajority 
financing policy paying for reform; paying for health care reform 
fraud policy waste; compliance plan; whistleblower 
freedom policy  
gang of eleven process stupak eleven; stupak 11; gang of 11 
gang of six process  
government run policy government sponsored; government administered 
government 
takeover policy  
grassroots process grassroot; grass roots 
Harry and Louise process  
health care costs policy rising costs; escalating costs; high cost of care; cost of care; cost of health care; too expensive; sixth of American economy; sixth of US economy 
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health disparity policy health disparities 
heritage 
foundation process  
history process historic; landmark 
house bill process hr 3200; hr3200; house plan; pelosi bill; tricommittee bill; tricommittee draft 
immigration policy immigrants; illegal immigrant; illegal immigration; illegal immigrants 
incivility process lack of decorum; civility 
income tax policy  
individual 
mandate policy 
require individuals; require all Americans; requiring individuals; requiring all 
Americans 
invincible youth policy  
liberty policy  
lifetime cap policy cap on benefits; lifetime limit 
limit deductions policy limit charitable donation deductions; limit deduction for chartiable donations 
limit medicare 
payments policy limit medicare reimbursements; regional disparaties in reimbursement rates 
long term care policy class act 
malpractice policy standard of care; medical liability; tort reform 
Massachusetts policy  
medical mistakes policy medical errors 
medicare for all policy  
medicare solvency policy solvency of medicare; medicare going bankrupt 
millionaire tax policy  
Nebraska process  
nonpartisan process  
obamacare policy  
obesity policy obese 
partisan process  
party of no process  
pharma process pharmaceutical companies; drug company; drug companies; drug lobby; pharmaceutical company; pharmaceutical industry; phrma 
playing politics process  
pooling risk policy  
preexisting 
condition policy preexisting; prior illness 
prevention policy preventable; wellness; preventive; behavior modification 
private insurers policy insurance companies; private insurance 
private market policy market; market system; marketplace 
process is broken process broken process 
public opinion process public opinion poll; polling; public support; public opposition; public protest; public outcry; public dissent; public opinion polls 
public option policy 
public plan; government option; government plan; government health care 
plan; government health care option; national plan; national health plan; public 
insurance option; public health insurance option 
quality of care policy health care quality; quality of health care; care quality 
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ration policy rationing; rationed 
real health reform policy real reform 
reconciliation process budget reconciliation 
red tape policy paperwork 
regulation policy government regulation 
Republican 
opposition process opposition from Republicans; obstruction 
Republican 
support process support from Republicans 
rescission policy rescinding; rescision; rescind 
right to health 
care policy right to care; fundamental right 
rights of the 
patient policy patients rights; privacy; patient rights 
rising premiums policy  escalating premiums 
same insurance as 
congress policy 
same coverage as congress; same insurance as members of congress; same 
coverage as members of congress 
security policy safety net 
senate bill process senate plan; senate reform; baucus bill; kennedy bill 
seniors process retirees; aarp; elderly 
sgr policy sustainable growth rate; doctor fix; doc fix 
single payer policy singlepayer 
Slaughter solution process deem and pass; self-executing 
small business 
owners process  
small business 
subsidies policy small business subsidy; small business exemption 
snack food tax policy tax on snack foods; taxes on snack foods; tax on unhealthy snacks; taxes on unhealthy snacks 
socialized 
medicine policy socialism; socialist 
soda tax policy tax on soda; taxes on soda; tax on soft drinks; taxes on soft drinks; soft drink tax; sugar tax 
state option policy opt out; opt in 
surcharge policy  
Switzerland policy Swiss 
tax credits policy  
taxing benefits policy taxing health benefits 
tea party process  
town hall process  
transparency policy  
trigger policy  
unaffordable policy ability to pay; affordable; able to pay; affordability; problems paying; problem paying 
underserved policy rural 
unemployment policy unemployed 
unfunded mandate policy  
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uninsured policy underinsured; lost coverage; lost insurance; lost health coverage; lost health insurance 
unions process labor union; organized labor; labor 
universal policy  
value added tax policy vat 
Vermont policy  
wait times policy wait for non emergency; wait time 
you lie process  
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